The politics behind Britain’s underfunded army

Voters haven’t prioritised spending on the military for decades, says Sean O’Grady

The Ajax programme for armoured vehicles is the latest in a long line of failed or over-expensive defence acquisitions (PA Media)

A senior US general has privately told defence secretary Ben Wallace that the British army is no longer regarded as a top-level “tier one” fighting force following decades of cuts. It comes after comments from the chair of the Defence Select Committee about the UK defence capability being “hollowed out” and warnings last week by a whole battalion of former defence chiefs about the parlous condition of the forces and the UK military industrial base. Lord Stirrup, Lord West, Lord Peach and Lord Houghton all spoke up.

Is the American general correct?

British defence sources say so. “Bottom line... it's an entire service unable to protect the UK and our allies for a decade.

“We have a wartime prime minister and a wartime chancellor. History will look back at the choices they make in the coming weeks as fundamental to whether this government genuinely believes that its primary duty is the defence of the realm or whether that is just a slogan to be given lip service.”

The sources want Rishi Sunak and Jeremy Hunt to increase the defence budget by at least £3bn a year; stop the plan to shrink the size of the army even further; and ease procurement of new kit.

Will Sunak and Hunt help?

It’s in the balance, given that the battle against inflation takes precedence. Liz Truss wanted defence spending to reach 3 per cent of national income by 2030. Since her demise, that commitment has been watered-down. Sunak has derided it as “an arbitrary target”.

Hunt has only said it will be running at 2 per cent a year, pending a revisiting of the Integrated Review, probably in the March Budget. Wallace has described the 3 per cent figure as a “planned marker”, whatever that means.

What is a ‘tier one’ military power?

The US general said Britain is not a “tier one” fighting force like the United States, Russia, China, or France and is “barely” in tier two. The US is the only true superpower with global reach and deep resilience, with the technological, economic and industrial resources to support it. America can fight major wars simultaneously, and engage on land, sea, in the air and in space, with nuclear capability. Next up are states such as China and Russia, dominant in certain regions and with huge militaries and nuclear arsenals but not necessarily the most advanced in technology, logistics, flexibility and global reach. France and, arguably, Britain have more global reach and experience, and nuclear deterrents, but smaller in sheer size. States such as Iran and North Korea, Israel and Turkey, India and Pakistan are regional military players, with varying strengths and weaknesses. Germany and Japan, partly for historical reasons, have the potential but not the will or ability to be more global players, with a legal and cultural bias towards self-defence and against foreign deployments.

What does the ministry of defence say?

It agrees with the critics. Wallace talks almost like an opposition spokesperson and freely admits that his government, like its Labour predecessors, neglected the armed forces and has left them “hollowed out”. His only criticism of the Labour front bench is that they won’t admit the Blair and Brown governments were just as bad. The Ministry of Defence resembles the HQ of an insurgency movement attacking No 10 and the Treasury, rather than a department supporting collective responsibility.

Who else could be to blame?

Whoever has been running military procurement for about the past century or more. Britain has a particularly poor record of efficient and timely project management. Waste is a byword. The disastrous Ajax programme for new armoured vehicles is the latest in a long line of failed or over-expensive defence acquisitions. The future of the new Type 32 frigates is also uncertain, though more about “affordability” than technical issues.

Such procurement problems have generally resulted in buying American or cooperating with allies to build, for example, fighter jets. The new initiative with Italy and Japan on aircraft is the latest example. Arguably, it has left “defence resilience” weakened.

Brexit has also hindered defence and security cooperation, both industrial policy and in force deployments, such as in the Mediterranean, and the UK can no longer draw on the diplomatic heft of the EU and solidarity from the UN (for example on the Falklands and the British Indian Ocean Territory).

What do we expect of our armed forces?

Too much. The overriding problem, which has been growing for years, is that successive governments of all parties that keep asking the forces to do more with less despite a more global role now than at any time since Britain abandoned its “east of Aden” responsibilities half a century ago. Ukraine, Nato, Aukus, nuclear, cyber, AI, anti-terror, peacekeeping, covering for industrial action… it’s a long list of requirements.

Are there votes to be had from a strong defence policy?

Few. Even now, with the enhanced threats of Russian expansionism and global terror and cyberattacks, voters seem at best complacent about defence. The British military certainly has fewer political “allies” to call on to defend it. As the number of service personnel shrinks, so too does their influence in society. That said, respect for their bravery and their historic sacrifices is running high. But until war seems around the corner, electors will tend to worry more about the cost of living, the NHS, schools and immigration.

So it’s not a winner for the Tories?

It’s one of the few areas where the Conservatives still enjoy a lead over Labour (27 per cent to 19 per cent – YouGov, November 2022). However, the issue generally isn’t as “salient” as others, and doesn’t drive voting behaviour very often outside particular constituencies, such as in Portsmouth. Since Keir Starmer took over as Labour leader, there is now much less difference between the main parties on central issues such as Nato, nuclear armaments, broad spending commitments, the welfare of ex-service people and so on. That's all in contrast to the Thatcher years when defence spending was boosted in real terms even at times of recession. At the height of the Cold War with Russia, it was a very popular policy among Conservative voters. Perhaps it will be so again.