Are Conservatives more selfish than their left-wing rivals?

In his new book ‘What’s in it for me?’, Thomas Prosser takes a closer look at why scathing views of the Tories persist

Low-income voters have been attracted to Johnsonian conservatism (Getty)

Is there some society you know that doesn’t run on greed? You think Russia doesn’t run on greed? You think China doesn’t run on greed? What is greed? Of course, none of us are greedy, it’s only the other fellow who’s greedy. The world runs on individuals pursuing their separate interests.” – Milton Friedman

Conservatives are bastards. This kind of verdict, often phrased in fruitier language, has long been accepted wisdom among sections of the left; the rise of social media and Jeremy Corbyn merely pronounced this trend. Such assertions reflect the conviction that conservatives are selfish. Critics point to the long-standing association between the Conservative Party and the rich, leading to policies which are favourable to wealthier citizens. Aside from claims that the Conservatives are more likely to introduce tax cuts and deregulation, many go further; on social media, there are allegations that the Conservatives wish to privatise the NHS or purge the poor with Covid-19.

Much of this is very crude. Conspiracy theories aside, the NHS has survived decades of Conservative rule. Certain assertions nonetheless contain grains of truth. For many years, the Conservative Party has relied on richer voters, who in turn expect the party to introduce policies consistent with their interests. The relationship between the Conservative Party and richer classes has been evident throughout modern times, though it became particularly apparent during the Thatcher governments. In these years, the Conservatives aggressively lowered taxes and deregulated markets to satisfy their wealthy support base. There are similar parties in other developed countries. Some are more moderate, such as the German Christian Democratic Union, whereas others are more radical, such as the US Republican Party.

There is a long-standing association between the Conservative Party and the rich, leading to policies which are favourable to wealthier citizens

It is true that conservative values concern more than economics. In Britain, a variety of groups which are resistant to change belong to the Conservative Party; these include rural and religious communities. Such cases show the importance of non-material influences. Because of strong attachment to localities and/or particular values, the politics of certain citizens are less sensitive to economic incentives. There is evidence that such groups are expanding, low-income voters increasingly attracted to Johnsonian conservatism.

Separate non-economic and economic agendas present definitional problems. Though political scientists consider the former to be authentically conservative, they label the latter economic libertarian or neoliberal. Given that the Conservative Party is synonymous with such economic policies, I include economic libertarianism in my definition of (small-c) conservatism. This demonstrates tensions between economic and non-economic aspects of conservatism, which I will explore.

Why conservatism is broader than self-interest

If this wider definition is accepted, modern conservatism exhibits a clear relationship with economic self-interest. The precise nature of this relationship is nonetheless contingent. There are intellectual and institutional filters, the conservative worldview being wider than mere self-interest and the institutions of government implying care for the common good, which ensure that conservative self-interest is indirectly realised. 

These constraints are relevant to all world views, meaning that conservatism demonstrates mediating influences with which we must be familiar. Despite these nuances, there is one fact which must be stated baldly; many conservative voters are motivated by conscious self-interest. Conservatism is popular among groups such as small and large business owners and managers. Clear command structures in such occupations are related to conservative cultural views, yet economic motives are central. The low tax and regulatory burdens associated with conservatism benefit such citizens.

The relationship between conservatism and the self-interest of the rich provokes debate. Left-wingers hold scathing views of the Conservative Party; on social media, Labour supporters denounce conservatives for their selfishness. Though the deregulatory policies supported by conservatives are problematic – I argue below that they cause instability – defence of the interests of supporters is not unique to conservatives; it is a practice in which all parties engage. The traditional ability of left-wing parties to curb inequality was related to poorer electoral bases, rather than the moral qualities of leaders and supporters. The conscious self-interest of some conservatives is nonetheless unattractive; the way in which this behaviour entrenches existing inequalities, as opposed to the self-interest of poorer citizens, makes it antisocial. 

If conservative belief in the small state is to be fair, it must be applied consistently

At policy level, those conservative measures which flout orthodoxy also grate. The pension triple lock, a coalition policy which for electoral reasons protected pensioners from austerity, is one example; if conservative belief in the small state is to be fair, it must be applied consistently. Whatever the behaviour of certain conservatives, two caveats about the nature of conservatism must be made. 

Firstly, there is more to the conservative world view than self-interest. Ideas have a life of their own, following peculiar developmental paths and embodying more than rational calculation. This is illustrated by the evolution of conservative thought. From the end of the 18th century, thinkers such as Adam Smith argued for the primacy of private property. Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman continued this tradition in modern times, defending capital from socialist attacks. It is crucial to note that these authorities did not write with material goals in mind. Such writers had intellectual and ethical aims and developed a rich body of conservative thought; this tradition conceives of self-reliance in moral terms and advocates a state which facilitates this end.

When in office, governing parties are obliged to advance the common good; this is a result of the wider duties of government

These ideas became popular because they were convenient to wealthier citizens. There is an important link between ideas and interests. Though some conservative voters do not genuinely believe in such ideas, supporting conservative parties for financial reasons and favouring measures like the triple lock when economic libertarianism threatens their interests, other conservatives are different. The behaviour of conservative activists, a group distinct from voters, is revealing. Rather than engaging in politics for economic reasons, activists genuinely believe in conservative ideas of self-reliance; the moral principles of Thatcherism are a continued inspiration. The equation of conservatism with selfishness is thus reductive. There are numerous conservatives who are motivated by moral concerns and consider conservatism to be in the general interest. This influence of ideas is relevant to all perspectives, implying that world views must be understood in their own terms.

A second caveat is that conservatism shows that governing parties do not merely serve the interests of supporters; institutional influences must be considered. When in office, governing parties are obliged to advance the common good; this is a result of the wider duties of government. Quite aside from areas such as defence, in which geopolitical realities and alliances constrain governments, economic policy is framed with reference to the common good; this is ensured by institutions such as the Bank of England, which guard against excessive politicisation. 

The civil service is also crucial, many underestimating its role during the Covid-19 crisis. Though some argue that Conservative governments are different, riding roughshod over opponents to enrich supporters, there is limited evidence for this. Not only have policies in the one-nation tradition improved conditions for the poorest, but certain decisions have angered the party base. The Cameron government’s means-testing of child benefit, which disadvantaged richer recipients, is a case in point. The left is not exempt from similar challenges. In several cases, Attlee, Mitterrand and Syriza governments being famous examples, it has been discovered that governments must forsake bases to advance the common good.

Conservatism and inequality: a contradictory relationship?

Despite the contingent relationship between conservatism and self-interest, effects of conservatism present a different problem. In this sense, conservatism demonstrates a crucial principle which is relevant to other world views; this is a phenomenon which I call externalisation. Humans have distinct interests, yet live in one world with finite resources. As is well known, humankind disputes these resources; innumerable wars, not to mention quarrels which fall short of armed conflict, have resulted from this problem. If we are to live peaceably, a way must be found to reconcile competing interests; this is particularly true in a globalised world. In my opinion, certain world views do not do this successfully. Externalisation involves a process in which the pursuit of self-interest by one group threatens the welfare of others, jeopardising the good of all.

If we are to live peaceably, a way must be found to reconcile competing interests; this is particularly true in a globalised world

The most dramatic instances of externalisation are associated with national populism. The potential of national populism to create tension between countries means that it is particularly destabilising. Conservatism is nonetheless prone to its own form of externalisation, which is relevant to contemporary politics and is an Achilles’ heel of the world view. This is the tendency of conservatism to create inequality. 

Across the west in recent decades, the deregulatory measures which are favoured by conservatives have tended to increase inequality. In Britain, inequality grew markedly in the early 1980s, associated with Thatcher reforms. Though overall levels have since remained steady, certain groups have been badly affected; these include the long-term unemployed and young middle classes. Many groups have become trapped in dangerously precarious conditions, Covid-19 making this evident. In recent times, the income of the top 1 per cent has expanded, with CEO-average worker salary ratios rising from 45:1 in the mid-1990s to 129:1 in 2016. A series of drivers have encouraged such trends. 

Not only have reductions in benefits fuelled inequality, but rising property prices have excluded certain groups from the housing market. Though many of these tendencies are related to structural influences associated with globalisation, Conservative governments have been far from innocent, advocating the shrinking of the state. In comparison to western sister parties, the Conservative Party has embraced deregulation particularly keenly. This is associated with self-interest, the Conservative base facilitating policies which benefit wealthier supporters.

The relationship between free market economics and disorder has long been acknowledged

Inequality is associated with negative trends. As evidenced by research, unequal societies are more prone to problems such as obesity and addiction. The basis of this relationship is clear; as life becomes more insecure, the desire for short-term gratification increases. Related to this, unequal societies are more dangerous; the reader might reflect on whether they would prefer to stroll late at night in Mexico City or Copenhagen. Damaging as such developments are, there is one consequence of inequality which undermines the internal consistency of conservatism and means that, even by its own logic, conservatism has difficulty reconciling self-interest with the common good. This is the tendency of inequality to threaten order. I concentrate on this effect not only because it is vital to conservatism, demonstrating tension between economic and non-economic aspects of the world view, but also due to consequences for global stability.

To an extent to which other world views do not, conservatism places a premium on order. From at least the time of Edmund Burke, a late 18th-century philosopher who recoiled at revolutionary violence in France, emphasis has been placed upon the preservation of institutions. Conservatives argue that ruptures with established institutions risk discarding their best aspects, endangering political stability. 

There is much in this, particularly when the institutions are liberal-democratic ones; it is difficult to think of an instance in which the overthrow of liberal-democratic institutions has led to a better alternative. Social democrats and liberals thus use aspects of this argument, particularly in countries such as Germany which are historically prone to instability. It is especially relevant in a globalised world. Given increased interconnectedness, disorder in one country has greater potential to disrupt elsewhere.

The relationship between free market economics and disorder has long been acknowledged. In The Great Transformation, interwar economist Karl Polanyi noted the instability of 19th-century British capitalism, arguing that social conditions associated with unregulated markets encouraged challenges to the system such as rural riots and Chartism. Polanyi lived through similar processes; the rise of extremists of the 1930s reflected reluctance to intervene in failing markets. These experiences marked post-war conservatives, such as Conservative prime minister Harold Macmillan, who rejected economic libertarianism. The problem endures to this day. Even if the liberalisation of markets has produced economic growth, accompanying inequality has caused serious unrest.

In the west, the most visible symptom has been the rise of anti-establishment parties; in recent years, left- and right-wing radicals have won increasing support. The emergence of these parties is related to the stagnation of living standards. Globalisation has had its successes, millions having been lifted out of poverty in developing countries, yet the relative position of the middle and working classes in developed countries has declined. Since the economic crisis, wage growth has been weak; in the UK, the real wages of the median worker fell by almost 5 per cent from 2008 to 2017. Despite these developments, the rich have fared comparatively well. Trends are complex, income inequality remaining steady in Britain, yet the income share of the rich has increased in most contexts; international data shows a comparative rise in the household incomes of the richest 10 per cent.

Relative declines are particularly significant. Humans can be happy with fewer resources than we enjoy today; contentedness of post-war decades, a period marked by austere yet rising standards, is evidence of this. In our time, the tendency for middle-income citizens to lose ground to the rich is particularly relevant. Humans hate loss of status; this reflects primordial anxieties and can be observed in every society. Relative deprivation theory recognises this. Developed in the mid-20th century by Garry Runciman, the theory states that human proximity to resources which they believe to be in their reach, yet cannot obtain, is a key cause of discontent.

Conservative economic policies are closely linked to recent relative declines. Housing and labour market policy has tended to disadvantage groups such as the upper-working and lower-middle classes; young members have particularly suffered. Independent of questions of justice, the political implications of these processes are key. Middle-income groups are politically crucial, comprising electoral bases of established parties. Discontent among these voters has thus proved a boon for anti-establishment parties; in recent years, these movements have grown across the west. 

There is no iron link between the success of these parties and decline of living standards, national-populist movements prospering in several buoyant contexts, yet research suggests that western politics is increasingly affected by this loop; recent studies find that national populism reflects comparative hardship within generally favourable economic contexts and perception of loss of status.

Anti-establishment parties undermine internal and external order. In terms of the former, the radical tendency to create enemies causes internal unrest; this is compounded by disdain for parliamentary procedure, related to the preference of these movements for popular legitimacy. In terms of the latter, such parties cause external tension through conflict with neighbouring countries. This is particularly true of national populists. 

Brexit encapsulates many of these threats. The policy breaks long-established relations with a premier international organisation, because of a referendum which bypassed parliament. Implementation has threatened public order, and has raised the spectre of shortages of basic supplies and riots. It is thus difficult to reconcile Brexit with conservatism. Though many who support Brexit identify as conservatives, the associated disorder and institutional rupture make this difficult to credit; this interpretation is validated by the initial opposition of most Conservative MPs. The popularity of Brexit among grassroots Conservatives and sections of the parliamentary party rather indicates a drift towards national populism, consuming the entire Conservative Party under Boris Johnson.

Lavish cultures of philanthropy have coexisted with gross inequalities, studies finding that income inequality is associated with charity

National-populist self-interest is associated with continuity of local conditions. Because of their limited mobility, citizens with low income and education prefer a world in which change is slower. Conservative voters increasingly correspond to this profile, the party winning historic support among low-income citizens in the 2019 election. Given that such voters also prefer redistributive measures, contrary to conservative orthodoxy, there is potential for discord in the Conservative support base. The existence of poorer supporters will make the Johnson government more redistributive and changes will be restricted.

Despite such developments, not all Brexit-supporting conservatives are poor: 3.1 per cent of AB voters supported Brexit, many of whom are traditional conservatives. Although these citizens prefer the economic libertarian measures discussed above, they tend to be culturally conservative. Many are patriotic, while some support causes such as the death penalty and fox hunting. These traditional attitudes are based on resistance to change, evoking the Burkean argument that change upsets stability. In the parliamentary Conservative Party, figures such as Jacob Rees-Mogg are associated with this agenda. Certain conservatives are incorrigible traditionalists, echoing reactionary thinkers such as Donoso Cortés.

Maintenance of the status quo is in the interests of the rich, lack of change preserving inequalities, yet traditional conservativism cannot be reduced to mere defence of privilege. As I explain above, ideas have a life of their own; conservative thought draws from numerous influences and has a long history. Conservatism has also taken a historically contingent path, reflecting past challenges. In the British case, the status of the country as an island is significant, meaning that conservatives value independence and a small state. Support of richer conservatives for Brexit can be explained in these terms. 

Brexit was in the material interests of certain wealthier conservatives, for example small business owners who wished to evade European regulations, yet in many cases attachment to conservative ideas was more significant. Other conservatives may have advocated Remain, yet one point of a world view which defended tradition was support for Brexit; this was particularly so in rural areas, in which tradition is more important. British history also meant that sovereignty was crucial; this was a stronger argument of the Leave campaign.

Conservatives admittedly contest arguments which have been made here, proposing various means of managing inequality. More felicitously, conservatives advocate philanthropy; more ominously, conservatives advocate authoritarian law and order methods. Though such approaches have successes, often in contexts in which alternatives are unfeasible, I am sceptical. Lavish cultures of philanthropy have coexisted with gross inequalities, studies finding that income inequality is associated with charity, while draconian law enforcement tends to be ineffective. These debates are well-rehearsed and conservatives have established positions, yet recent experiences suggest that conservatism requires a basic rethink. In the years since the economic crisis, there is increasing consensus that deregulation causes serious problems; declining popularity among the public is notable.

Conservatism is thus characterised by considerable externalisation; because of the disruptive effects of conservative economic policies, the stability which is desired by conservatives is difficult to maintain. This problem may have been less acute historically, post-war conservatives rejecting economic libertarianism for measures which promoted stability, yet globalisation has disrupted this balance. Not only has the process encouraged deregulation, but it quickens the spread of disorder. Because of these developments, economic and non-economic aspects of conservatism have conflicted with one another, causing a crisis of the world view.

The tendency of conservatism to create externalisation may be considerable, yet certain world views are worse. National populism is one; because of its propensity to create enemies, this position causes internal and external instability. Increasing overlap between conservatism and national populism is not coincidental. As the inability of conservatism to stem change has become evident, certain conservatives have become attracted to uncompromising stances. 

‘What’s in it for Me? Self-Interest and Political Difference’ by Thomas Prosser is available now. Manchester University Press, £14.99