Putin has never looked weaker – it is hard to see how he can ever recover

The Russian president may not be able to win a war on two fronts, writes Mary Dejevsky. His address in the wake of the Wagner uprising sounded desperate instead of defiant

Russia president Vladimir Putin (Sputnik)

At 10am this morning, Moscow time, Vladimir Putin went on Russian state television with a recorded message that few, including the president himself, can ever have imagined him delivering.

“I am appealing to the citizens of Russia, to the armed forces, to the institutions of law enforcement, to the special services, to the soldiers and commanders who are currently fighting on the front line... I’m appealing also to those who have been drawn into... such a serious crime as armed rebellion.”

Peppering his short speech with words like “revolt”, “betrayal” and “treason”, he conceded that a part of his country – and not just any part, but the nerve centre for military operations in Ukraine at Rostov-on-Don – was out of Moscow’s control and answering to Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder and commander of the mercenary Wagner Group.

Prigozhin himself put out his own video, appearing to confirm that his forces were in charge of military operations in Rostov, while stressing that flights to and from the military airfield were running normally, as was armed action against Ukraine. His message appeared to be that this was a mutiny against the military command in Moscow, not a coup against Putin, and certainly not a treasonous change of sides.

As such, what happened overnight shows Prigozhin translating into action what had until now remained fierce words against the Russian top brass, the defence establishment, headed by Sergei Shoigu, and sections of the Russian elite, whom he accused of not sending their sons and daughter to fight. He has now threatened to lead a march on Moscow.

The significance of what has happened so far can hardly be overestimated. After months of not rising to Prigozhin’s bait, Putin has been forced to respond – and not just to Prigozhin, but in an appeal to all Russians. His words may have sounded strong, but the fact that he felt compelled to make the address at all makes him look, if not weak, then considerably weaker than he has looked hitherto.

And it is hard to see how he can recoup much of that lost political strength. In his appeal, Putin threatened the mutineers with the severest of punishments if they did not see the error of their ways. But can he enforce that? The (very senior) Russian military command in Rostov seems to have rolled over, if not actually acquiesced, in Prigozhin’s takeover of their facilities. What does this say about the strength of loyalty to the high command, and by extension to Putin?

Against this, does Prigozhin have the support and the numbers to march on Moscow, as he threatens? Again, this is not clear. Rostov is a long way from Moscow – more than 1,000km, or around two days (or one very long day’s drive).

But an ominous sign for Moscow were reports that Wagner forces were already in control of military facilities in Voronezh, about 300km (186 miles) closer to Moscow – where many Russian troops have been garrisoned before being ordered into Ukraine. This is a city with a long military history – it is where Peter the Great built his first ships, and it prided itself in Soviet times on being the last front in the Second World War before Stalingrad. If Wagner is now in control of Voronezh, what next?

Opinion on the Ukraine war at the Russian grassroots has always been exceptionally hard to gauge. Anti-war opposition has largely been silenced, with protests suppressed, the most vocal and influential objectors imprisoned, and those fearing conscription allowed to leave the country. Most overt opposition has come from those – like Prigozhin – objecting that the war has been incompetently run and prosecuted with insufficient vigour by Moscow.

It is unclear how far such sentiments may be shared, but if they were to feed into more general dissatisfaction – with living standards, the state of Russia, etc – then Prigozhin’s threat to march on Moscow could be more of a threat, not just to the military high command, but to Putin, than it currently appears. There is also the historical precedent, mentioned specifically by Putin in his address as a warning, of the way military rebellion helped precipitate the Bolshevik Revolution and then the ruinous civil war.

Even when Ukrainian drones hovered over the Kremlin and on another occasion struck the elite Moscow suburb of Rublyovka, popular indignation seemed muted.  Indeed, many foreign residents and visitors to Russia have remarked on how most of the population seemed to be setting the war to one side, as far as possible, and just getting on with their lives. One question is whether this is possible any longer, given the tone and terms of Putin’s broadcast.

If Putin and the central military command can halt the advance of Prigozhin’s Wagner, and exact demonstrative punishment, then he may be able to reassert his authority. It is barely conceivable that he would be compelled to negotiate with Prigozhin, but might Putin be forced to sacrifice his defence minister, or a general or two? None of that would bespeak unchallenged power in the Kremlin.

The open split with Wagner has also weakened Putin – and Russia – in other, significant, ways. Until now, it was just about possible to regard the Russian armed forces and Wagner as ultimately fighting on the same side and helping each other. After all, Wagner forces handed over the eastern city of Bucha to the regular military after they had borne the brunt of the long weeks of fighting. That argument is harder to make now.

The other – obvious, but nonetheless dramatic – conclusion is that this open military strife in Russia potentially transforms the balance of advantage in the war in favour of President Zelensky and Ukraine. And it could not have come at a better time. The much-trailed spring counteroffensive appeared to be flagging, if not to have failed. The destruction of the Kakhovka dam seemed to be a setback for both sides. And although Ukraine was making pinpricks into Russian territory, with drone strikes, acts of sabotage and cross-border incursions, there were no decisive results.

Does discord in Russia make a Ukrainian victory more likely? Not necessarily. There is no sign that Putin has any greater appetite for concessions than he has had in the past, and if Prigozhin has his way, he will demand more military effort against Ukraine, not less. Whether Putin can fight a war on two fronts – at home and against Kyiv – is another matter. The notes of determination, but also desperation, in parts of his appeal could not be missed.

“As president of Russia and commander in chief, and a citizen of Russia,” he said, “I will do all in my power to preserve the country, defend the constitutional order, and the life, security and freedom of our citizens.” For the first time since he declared the “special military operation” on 24 February last year, the question arises as to whether that will be enough.