If Iran holds its nerve and stays in the nuclear deal until next year, it could beat Trump at his own game

By waiting out the US president, it could widen the transatlantic gulf between Washington and its dwindling allies in Europe

For much of Donald Trump’s reign, Iran has exercised patience. Only in recent months has it ramped up pressure on adversaries by grabbing or allegedly sabotaging private ships at sea and inching forward with dormant aspects of its nuclear programme.

But in addition to the possibility that Trump could leave the White House on 21 January 2021 and a friendlier US president could come into office, there are other approaching deadlines that might be moderating Iran’s behaviour; one is beginning to catch the attention of policymakers in the west.

It was with much fanfare last week that Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s president, announced the launch of the Bavar-373, a domestically made missile defence system that he described as similar to the Russian S-300. Just a few days later, Iran reportedly test-fired what it described as a new missile, the latest addition to its conventional weaponry despite years-long United Nations Security Council restrictions on the sale of weapons to Iran. While there’s a lot of attention on the country’s controversial nuclear programme, the Iranian regime invests far more in its domestic weapons industry, and polls have suggested popular support for Iran’s pursuit of missiles and conventional defences.

“When the enemy launches a missile against us, we cannot give a speech asking him to self-destroy the missile in the air,” Rouhani said. “Now that our enemies do not accept logic, we cannot respond with logic.”

Ever since Trump came to power, withdrew from the nuclear deal and launched his maximum pressure campaign against Iran, European diplomats and even some Iranian officials have been urging leaders in Tehran to wait him out.

Not only was there a high possibility that Trump wouldn’t obtain a second term, his antics and unilateral behaviour has alienated America’s longtime partners, so it would work to Iran’s advantage to play adult and widen the transatlantic gulf between Washington and its allies in Brussels, London, Paris and Berlin.

But perhaps equally important, as part of the nuclear deal or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), international restrictions on Iran’s sale and purchase of international weapons, imposed in 2006, 2007 and 2010 at the height of the crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme, will expire on 18 October 2020.

“If the JCPOA stays intact until next year, all the arms embargoes on Iran will be lifted... which means we will be able to buy and sell any weapons,” Rouhani said in a speech earlier this month. “We are ready for next year to buy any weapons that we need and we have also done the initial preparation.”

In addition, UN travel restrictions on top security officials such as Revolutionary Guard commander general Hassan Salami will be lifted.

The US is keenly aware of the dates. The State Department has installed an ominous ticking clock counting the days to 18 October 2020 at the top of its website’s Iran page.

“The Iranian regime will also be free to sell weapons to anyone, including terrorist proxies, and countries like Russia and China will be able to sell the Iranian regime tanks, missiles and air defence equipment,” the website says.

For days, Mike Pompeo, US secretary of state, has been urging sceptical international counterparts to extend the sanctions.

“Time is drawing short to continue this activity of restricting Iran’s capacity to foment its terror regime,” he said at a speech at the UN last week. “The international community will have plenty of time to see how long it has until Iran is unshackled to create new turmoil, and figure out what it must do to prevent this from happening.”

US officials warn that removing the restrictions could start a new arms race in the Middle East, further destabilising the region and the world.

But experts say Russia and China would likely be reluctant to sell Iran their most advanced weapons, worried about fallout in the region and upsetting other allies in the Arabian Peninsula. Iran’s declining revenues under harsh US sanctions will also curtail its conventional weapons appetite.

Still, the removal will probably also give Iran a military windfall, and breathing space – the ability to buy parts and ammunition for its weapons without sneaking around, as well as the capability of further refining its domestic weapons industry to assemble knock-offs of Russian, Chinese or other weaponry.

“You will have a situation where Iran will be able to do legally what it has been doing illegally because of Security Council resolutions,” said Amir Toumaj, an independent Iran analyst in Washington. “They’ll look forward to selectively modernising their military.”

Even before the sanctions were imposed, Iran was not able to buy top-shelf Russian or Chinese weapons. The west refused to sell it anything.

But Tehran was able to purchase some crucial systems. Iranian versions of Chinese C-802 anti-ship missiles purchased by Tehran were used by Lebanese Hezbollah to target Israeli ships during a 2006 war, and may be in the hands of Yemeni Houthi fighters battling Saudi-backed forces.

The removal of UN sanctions on key figures is also another fruit of the JCPOA Iran looks forward to. Controversial figures such as Revolutionary Guard general Qassem Suleimani, who commands Iran’s clandestine overseas expeditionary force, could travel to countries like Afghanistan, Iraq or Lebanon without triggering international punishments against his hosts.

Both the removal of conventional weapons purchases and sales and the travel restrictions could be annulled only by a unanimous vote of the five veto-wielding members of the Security Council.

“If there’s any situation like [Iran withdrawing] completely from the JCPOA then the Security Council could extend the sanctions,” said Toumaj.

In the face of continued provocations by the US and its allies, including alleged Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria and Iraq, many wonder if and when Iran will lash out. But Iran has strong incentives to maintain its current measured course, at least until next October.