Donald Trump’s foreign policy ideas aren’t as crazy as they seem

At a time of widespread popular disenchantment with the mistakes made by traditional politicians, an argument can be made for at least trying a different approach

Even if Trump does manage to cobble together an administration that shares his ideals, he would still have Congress to reckon with (AP)

After crisscrossing the country making his urgent last claims to the White House, Donald Trump has made it. But there is still nothing in his appearance or demeanour to suggest a president-in-waiting – at least not a president the United States has elected in recent times.

His shortcomings as President-elect appear particularly glaring on foreign policy, where – so it would seem – his priorities can be summed up on the back of an envelope: bring Mr Putin in, keep the Mexicans out and make other countries pay a proper price for US protection.

And it is in foreign affairs policy that the contrast with Hillary Clinton – former First Lady, former Senator, much-travelled former Secretary of State, and now former presidential candidate – is at its most stark. Mr Trump can easily be dismissed as an ignoramus, and/or a danger to US power and standing in the world.

This, though, is to underestimate two realities: the first relates to Mr Trump’s view of the world, insofar as he has divulged it; the second to how the United States actually works.

On Mr Trump himself: it is quite simply wrong to argue that he has no coherent world view. Those of us who regard ourselves as liberal Europeans, or US Democrats, or even middle-of-the road Republicans may not like it – and may choose to highlight the apparent contradictions – but it fits into a strand of foreign policy that has existed in the United States for a very long time.

It is isolationist, in wanting no part in foreign wars that have no direct impact on US national security; remember the US reluctance to enter the Second World War.

It is protectionist, in the sense of wanting to protect American workers against “unfair” competition. It is more legalistic than outright xenophobic (the difference between opposing all immigration and opposing irregular migration).

It is realistic rather than ideological – hence the idea that a strong US leader should be able to do business with Mr Putin (and others).

And it is what would be called in today’s parlance fiercely “transactional”: wanting something for something, as manifested in Mr Trump’s view that US allies should have to pay much more for their defence guarantees and that free trade deals have been to the disadvantage of American workers.

What must also be recognised is that, while all these elements, individually and cumulatively, may reflect Donald Trump’s business-eye view of the world, they also appeal to many Americans. In today’s US, that would include especially those towards the bottom of the economic pile, whose wages have been most affected by cheap, illegal or exported labour and whose sons and daughters have been disproportionately in the front line in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Nor should Trump be dismissed too readily as a foreign policy buffoon. He may not know anything like as much as Hillary Clinton and her team know about the outside world. But, as a much-travelled businessman now married to his second Slavonic wife, he may well know other things that are not without relevance for foreign policy – about reading people’s intentions, say, about concluding agreements and about national difference and affinity. At a time of widespread popular disenchantment with the mistakes made by traditional politicians, an argument can be made for at least trying a different approach.

Which brings us to the second reality: how the US system actually works. What degree of freedom would Donald Trump actually have to implement any of his ideas?

It is true that a US President has more authority in foreign policy than in the domestic domain. But this does not mean Mr Trump can simply march into the White House, invite Mr Putin over for a chat, dispatch the army to build his wall with Mexico and start renegotiating terms with Nato and the country’s other allies.

However irresponsible Mr Trump’s detractors fear he may be, this is not how things happen. There is a two-month transition period for the appointment of an administration and advisers. US presidents have more freedom here than their European counterparts, because senior posts in the equivalent of the Civil Service traditionally go to political appointees.

But President Trump finds himself with many jobs to fill, and could well have a hard time finding like-minded people to fill them (George W Bush had a similar, if lesser, problem when he started out). Quite a few senior figures who might have hoped for foreign policy positions in a Republican administration have already ruled themselves out.

Whether they would be so principled, if asked “to serve” is another matter, but Mr Trump cannot expect – and might not even want – a cabinet of “yes-people”. He will surely know that some of the least qualified foreign policy presidents – Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan – were also the most discriminating in seeking advice and judged by history to be among the most successful.

But even if Trump does manage to cobble together a distinctly Trumpist administration, he would still have Congress to reckon with. Regardless of its exact composition, Congress has been notably hostile to Russia and China. It has been split on the benefits of free trade and migration, and – thanks to President Obama’s decision to refer direct military intervention in Syria to a vote in Congress – it could in future expect the final say in interventions overseas.

Two specific pledges – abrogating the nuclear treaty with Iran and that wall with Mexico – could also be given a rough ride.

The Iran treaty has plenty of opponents among Republicans, but probably not enough to be overturned, while the Mexico wall could run up against states’ rights.

There are already long stretches of high fence along populated stretches of the border with Mexico, but the diplomacy, not to speak of the practicality, of walling off Mexico could make it – even for Mr Trump – a hard sell.

If the US system of checks and balances offers safeguards against the wilder excesses of Trumpism in power, it is also worth bearing in mind something else. Donald Trump has campaigned not as an iconoclast, but as an American.

The institution of the presidency comes with an aura of seriousness and responsibility that even as bluff a character as Donald Trump is likely to accept. Once he takes the oath it is the national interest he will have sworn to serve, and – strange though it might seem – in foreign policy there could be more continuity with the Obama years than change.