Tim Cross: Time will show if the lessons of 2006 were learnt

Soldier's view: The intent is to force the Palestinians to think again about their government

For those of us who have lived through the wars of 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982, and all the wars since, there is a strong element of deja vu as another ground campaign gets under way.

Leaving aside the political rights and wrongs, any military analysis should consider the Strategic Intent, the Operational Campaign Plan and the Tactical Battles.

Strategically, what is each side after? On the face of it, Hamas's intent is the establishment of a viable state – if not the destruction of Israel. Hamas clearly decided that the best way to keep the pot boiling was to goad Israel into taking what would be seen as repressive and disproportionate action; this to bring down the wrath of the international community and if possible to draw in allies. For its part – and in the knowledge that it currently has the support of the US – Israel sees no option but to deal with the constant rocket attacks by taking offensive military action. But it would appear that strategically their intent now is to destroy Hamas as an effective political and military force, forcing the Palestinians in Gaza to think again about the nature of their government.

Operationally, the Israeli campaign plan is what is known as a joint offensive – using air, land and naval power to isolate and destroy the Hamas leadership, and to destroy their ability to conduct attacks on Israeli settlements and towns. The strength of the initial air campaign seemingly caught Hamas off guard. That they have been hurt cannot be in dispute. But it is clear that Hamas's ability to continue to attack Israel has not yet been destroyed. Hence the land campaign. Whilst the decision to launch it will not have been taken lightly, it does seem that this was the intent from the start. The Israeli leadership will not have believed that they could destroy Hamas from the air. But a land campaign means closing with Hamas in tactical battles.

Tactically, Israel is able to use its armoured forces to good effect initially. The problem will come when they hit the urban centres. Fighting in built-up areas is notoriously difficult; it soaks up manpower, and casualty rates – on both sides – will be high. Finding and destroying all the weapon stockpiles will be no easy task.

It was tactically that Israel lost in the Lebanon in 2006; Israel says that it learnt lessons from that campaign. Time will tell.

The irony, however, is that even if you win tactically you don't necessarily win operationally or strategically. My guess is that Israeli forces will capture or destroy a lot of "stuff". They will probably win the majority of the physical fights, and they may well out-manoeuvre and out-think Hamas. But that will not be enough. The key component of military fighting power is the Moral Component. And the key issue here will be the way that this land campaign is fought, and the damage that is done. Many will die in the coming days, and the balance will surely be heavily against the Palestinians; and the flow of humanitarian support into Gaza has at best been constrained. This will only get worse. What the world will see will be an unequal fight; and I doubt that their sympathies will be with Israel.

Major General (Retired) Tim Cross was the senior British officer within the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad in 2003