Charles Duelfer: Prospects remain dim for inspectors allowed in sites

Iraq is offering to accept inspectors in some fashion as a tactic to derail international support for an American military build-up against the regime. But even if they do get into Iraq, their prospects are dim.

The United Nations inspectors have been and will be caught between the conflicting goals of Baghdad, Washington and other Security Council members. Their ability to succeed is limited by Iraq's lack of co-operation and the council's inability to force compliance.

Baghdad views weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as vital to survival of the regime. Chemical weapons were used in the war on Iran. Iraq believes its arsenal in 1991 helped to stop America from marching on Baghdad.

UN inspections, at best, may delay or complicate Iraq's weapons programme. Unscom, the former weapons-inspection team, tried for seven years to account for all Iraqi programmes. That tortured experience yielded partial compliance. Iraq gave up what it was forced to expose, and retained the rest.

The continuous cat-and-mouse game, and episodic American and British bombing, have given Baghdad excellent practice in concealing weapons.

The UN inspectors have, on paper, the right to immediate, unconditional, unrestricted access – words that sound good in New York but are difficult to implement in Iraq. Practicalities intrude.

For example, is it reasonable to demand that Iraq turn off its entire air defence system so inspectors may fly into Iraq anytime, and anywhere? Baghdad will reasonably point out that it has a legitimate air defence system and some accommodation must be made to provide information on UN flights.

From this, the Iraqi government can derive warning information on inspections. Similar accommodations will sprout in virtually all inspection activities.

Iraq's close monitoring of all inspection activities meant "no-notice" inspections rarely equated to surprise inspections. Unscom conducted hundreds of no-notice inspections. Only a few, though, were truly surprise inspections, and they developed into confrontations, delays and blockages.

If the UN-Iraqi process goes ahead, how will we know if a serious inspection regime is planned? One test will be whether activity since Unscom left in late 1998 will be investigated. Credible defectors report that Iraq has since expanded its WMD programmes.

The UN database includes the 200-300 important personnel from Iraq's earlier efforts. If the programmes have continued, many of these individuals will be involved. Inspectors must interview them without government presence to verify their work since 1998.

Does non-cooperation by Iraq mean they are not complying? Is war justified simply because some stubborn inspector was blocked from a sensitive security warehouse? If America is serious, it should not centre its argument on the inspection issue.

Washington needs to make a broader case. It needs to show the threat is broad and growing. To say Iraqis should change their own government is disingenuous . Outside intervention is needed to create conditions in which Iraqis can change their government.

The potential of Iraq will never be realised under this regime. A country that should be the engine of development in the Middle East will remain a contorted and dangerous mutant threatening the region and beyond. And the people will continue to suffer.

Charles Duelfer served as deputy chairman from 1993 to 2000 of Unscom. He is a visiting scholar at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.