Does the west need to start preparing for the post-Putin era?

The signs are already multiplying of unhappiness within two crucial social strata in Russia: the elite and the professional middle class, writes Mary Dejevsky

Putin’s departure, if it comes, is unlikely to be a result of popular pressure, at least from the streets (Reuters)

How might it end has to be the question of the moment. Not just how the horrors unfolding by the hour in Ukraine might be stopped, but what awaits the man who ordered what he called the “special military operation” and what most of the world now calls the invasion of Ukraine.

If part of the ending is, as it could be, the departure of Vladimir Putin, then – inconceivable though it may seem – the world may already be on the threshold of the post-Putin era. And the west has to be prepared for such an eventuality. That means uncertainty not just about the future of Ukraine – one of the biggest countries in Europe – but about the future of the huge landmass that is Russia, too.

Putin’s departure, if it comes, is unlikely to be a result of popular pressure, at least from the streets. Remarkable though it is how many Russians are continuing to protest, despite beatings and arrests now running into many thousands, this is a protest movement that can still be controlled, and those venturing on to the streets will be far outnumbered by those Russians who believe the Kremlin’s line, peddled interminably on the state media, to the effect that military action is limited and justified to combat a (wholly non-existent) Nazi threat from Ukraine.

It is even less likely to come from defeat in an election. The next presidential contest is due only in two years’ time and, if Putin is still in power (which I doubt), he will stand for re-election only if victory – by fair means or foul – is assured.

Nor is it realistic to stake too much on the International Criminal Court (ICC). A record 39 countries have asked the ICC to investigate Russia’s actions in Ukraine under the direction of its President, Vladimir Putin. Russia – in common, it should be said, with the United States – is not a member of the ICC. In theory, a referral could be made by the UN Security Council, but Russia’s veto means that this would fail at the first hurdle. No, the most likely route for Putin’s exit has to be a revolt from within, and that is possible almost regardless of the conclusion of the Ukraine war.

Of course, a perceived defeat or becoming bogged down or large numbers of casualties would become a big liability for Putin at home, but Russia’s firepower means that, for all Ukraine’s heroism, Russia is almost guaranteed to prevail. The more fiercely Ukrainians resist, the more ruthless the methods Russia is likely to use.

But the point is that even “victory” could spell the end for Putin. The signs are already multiplying of unhappiness within two crucial social strata in Russia: the elite and the professional middle class. As well as a smattering of the super-rich, the adult children of several ministers and Putin associates are among those who have used social media to voice their opposition. Professional associations – of medics, architects and the like – have gathered thousands of signatures for protest petitions.

While the super-rich are largely insulated financially by holding most of their funds abroad, the financial penalties are already being paid by the professional classes. It is they who cannot get their money out of ATMs, whose mortgages have doubled in cost, whose investments have plummeted.

One of Putin’s legacies, it was assumed, would be the economic stability and dramatically improved living standards he had brought after the chaos of the 1990s. That is already well on the way to being gone. These are people who travel, who have, or had, secure jobs, and what could be called a western lifestyle. They are aware of the effects of the war and opinion outside Russia. They are at home in the social and alternative media and are well aware how precipitately the war has already cost Russia its international standing; television footage from Ukraine is an indictment in itself.

And it is these groups whose resentment could sway someone within the Kremlin hierarchy to make a bid for power or to persuade Putin that his presidency is over, for the sake of saving Russia – ironically, perhaps, the very same cause in whose name Putin launched the war.

Putin’s departure could be a matter of months or years. Nikita Khrushchev was deposed two years after the Cuban missile crisis had been judged a Soviet climbdown. The collapse of the Soviet Union can be ascribed, in part, at least, to the lost war in Afghanistan and the return of a demoralised army. If some in Putin’s circle already realise the all-round cost to Russia of the war, the end of his presidency could come very suddenly, even before the fighting in Ukraine is at an end.  

Putin’s dominance makes it hard to identify potential successors, but any new leadership that wants to end the war, recognise Ukraine’s independence unconditionally and come to some accommodation over the rebel regions has to be welcomed. Despite the assumption in many quarters in the west over the years, however, there is no guarantee that the complexion of a new leadership would necessarily usher in a new era of east-west peace and friendship. Indeed, if Russia seems to have been worsted in the battles for Ukraine, a new resident in the Kremlin could be at least as hard for the west to deal with as Putin.

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It also has to be recognised that isolation and sanctions are unlikely by themselves to bring about regime change in Russia, and could indeed have the opposite effect. Sanctions imposed after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 only enhanced Putin’s domestic standing, as he was seen to stand alone against the west; they also helped boost Russia’s self-sufficiency, as it weaned itself off agricultural imports.

The sanctions could simply serve once again to convince not just Putin and his associates, but many ordinary Russians, that the western world is, and has always been, against them. Their conclusion might be that Russia has nothing to lose and might as well fight the war in Ukraine to the bitter end.

Nonetheless, it should not be too early for the west to correct some of its cardinal mistakes in its treatment of Russia in recent years. Russia’s security concerns will outlive Putin’s presidency, specifically Russia’s concern about the advance of Nato towards Russia’s borders. The west, the United States, Nato and the EU need to be more accepting of Russia’s fears, alongside those of the east and central Europeans who will feel even more threatened by Russia post-Ukraine. The often patronising tone – adopted by the UK in particular – needs to be dropped.

Above all, greater efforts must be made to reverse the trend towards a new east-west divide in Europe, and find a way of accommodating both Ukraine and Russia. This will not be easy, but it could, perversely perhaps, be a little easier now that Russia, Ukraine and the west have experienced the catastrophic cost of past failure.

This article was amended on 15 March 2022. It originally referred to 38 countries making a state party referral to the ICC, but on the date of publication that number should have read 39. It also said that the countries had asked the ICC to investigate Vladimir Putin, but the request was for ‘the prosecutor to investigate any acts of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide alleged to have occurred on the territory of Ukraine from 21 November 2013 onwards, including any allegations of current and ongoing crimes occurring throughout the territory of Ukraine.’